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The title of this book turns out to reflect he complexity of its argument: 
Divided We Stand, at first reading, suggests an analysis of the 
conflicting viewpoints on technologies and desirable futures, and this 
is, indeed, what we get, even if refracted through the lens of cultural 
theory. 'Cultural theory' here is the Mary-Douglas-inspired analysis 
of differences ininstitutionally embedded cultures with the help of a 
two-by-two matrix of positions, depending on the strength of insider- 
outsider boundaries (the 'group' dimension) and the strength of role 
differentiation (the 'grid' dimension). For the basics of this approach the 
book refers to existing literature and forthcoming companion volumes.' 
But there is more. On page 13, the full statement urns out to be: 
Divided we stand; united we fall. The normative side to the argument 
now becomes clear: we have to recognize the essential plurality of 
embedded cultures in order to avoid falling down. The conviction of 
the authors that they have found the key to viable social and technical 
development in modern society carries them through a variety of 
anecdotal examples and criticisms of other approaches, and culmin- 
ates in a plea for plural assessments of technology, each time when 
conflicting certainties appear. Their concern about avoidable im- 
passes and dead ends is one we can all share. The difficulty, ofcourse, 
is to show how and why the recognition of plurality will actually lead 
to better outcomes. Here, the catchy phrases may promise more than 
can be delivered. 
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Cultural theory has become fairly well known by now, and I will 
not bore the reader with an exposition of the individualists/ 
entrepeneurs, the hierarchists, the collectivists (called 'sectists' by 
others) and the fatalists (called 'ineffectuals' by others) and their 
respective styles or 'biases'. Schwarz and Thompson are clearly less 
partial in their labelling than Douglas and Wildavsky are,2 and in 
fact, try to argue for the value of the contribution of the collectivists 
(in their opening story about lavatory blocks being much improved 
thanks to the opposition of the German Greens to an earlier version 
of the blocks) and the non-negligible role of the fatalists (if only as the 
necessary backdrop to the controversies played out by the other 
three). The existence of the 'divisions' is necessary, they claim, and the 
aim should be mutual recognition rather than effacing or suppressing 
the differences. In other words: 
[the] pluralism ... is essential, in the sense that each cultural bias towards 
market solutions, towards hierarchical solutions, towards egalitarian solutions, 
and towards fatalistic acceptance is not viable on its own. Individualists, for 
instance, need the hierarchists to enforce the law of contract, the hierarchists need 
the fatalists to sit on top of, the egalitarians need the inegalitarian excesses of the 
individualists and the hierarchists to criticize, and so on. (142) 
The mutual dependencies ketched here are heterogeneous, to say the 
least. In fact, the authors are better at showing how things go wrong, 
or at least diverge, because of the working of the plural cultures, than 
they are at telling us how things go better once their existence is 
recognized and, presumably, acted upon. 
Their fall-back line is that professions like engineering and the law, 
and other mediating institutions, because of their practical nandling 
of situations, have accumulated and internalized 'tacit wisdom' about 
plural cultures. '[T]hen it is only a matter of designing the channels by 
which they can communicate that wisdom and thereby make it more 
explicit' (146). And if there is not enough of this tacit wisdom, 
'[m]ediating institutions ... should be designed (or redesigned) so 
that they always contain the requisite variety' (147). If readers are 
doubtful about the tacit wisdom of engineers in this respect, there is a 
further line of defence: the Dutch, because of their peculiar socio- 
political culture, have developed a particular form of technology 
assessment which tries to bring out plurality and make it useful for the 
assessments and choices that constitute technological developments. 
Being a Dutchman, and in addition strongly involved in the 
development of this so-called Constructive Technology Assessment, I 
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can hardly defect. But it is a promise, rather than an achievement. As 
support for an ambitious claim about the need for plural rationalities, 
it falls short. 
I am running ahead of the authors' argument here, and some of the 
earlier steps are much more convincing. The central insight, to my 
mind, is about patterns in uncertainty: 'Uncertainty, by definition, is
unpredictable but reaction to uncertainty, though it can take a 
number of widely divergent forms, would appear to be strongly 
patterned so predictable as to be almost certain' (90). Such 
patterns can be found empirically, by tracing risk handling styles, 
problem definitions, 'myths of nature'. It is especially in controversies 
about technologies, about risks, about energy forecasts - in essence, 
about the question 'Whose, if anyone's future wins?' (25) that the 
patterns can be characterized, and that the 'widely divergent forms' 
can be contained, so the authors assert, in a fourfold typology - that 
is, the four styles or cultural biases of cultural theory. There is, by 
now, enough case material (some of which is presented in the book) 
which indicates that the typology works - especially if handled 
flexibly. Case material also offers data about outcomes, but the 
interest of the authors is not so much in whose future wins, and why, 
but in 'where do the problem definitions come from?' (37). Thus they 
slant their analysis away from outcomes, and by going upstream 
rather than downstream, they create the hole in their argument hat I 
noted above. 
The strong patterning of reactions to uncertainty, and the cultural 
and institutional embedding of the patterns, is the stepping stone to a 
sustained and welcome criticism of the politics of interest explana- 
tions. In so far as politics of interest models consider interests as 
psychological facts, behaviour without any reference to social 
contexts (and the interactions going on, I add), the criticism is 
obvious. Schwarz and Thompson's additional point is that not all 
interests are possible, because actors must convincingly account for 
their actions in such a way as to be socially viable (52, emphasis 
added). Thus, 'political cultures' emerge and stabilize, and these 
should provide the framework for policy analysis, rather than given 
interests. Such a concept allows the analysis of the NIMBY (Not In 
My Back Yard) protest against the disposal of nuclear waste (which 
also allows an interest politics explanation) and protesting to prevent 
the disposal of nuclear waste in the middle of the Gobi desert (that is, 
NIABY: Not in Anyone's Backyard), in one framework (58-59). So 
far so good. One may be hesitant to accept 'political cultures' as a 
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social phenomenon in its own right, but since specific patterns occur, 
one needs some cognitive or cultural structure as explanation. 
Then there is a further shift, to the interesting question 'what leads 
one individual to support one policy ... and another individual to 
support another policy' (90), if we cannot interpret hat in terms of 
interests or alignments only. This question leads the authors astray 
into a revival of the oversocialized conception of man, and into a bit 
of metaphysics. 
Their first answer to the question is summarized as: 
[T]hese declarations these value-determined selections of fact . . . are not so 
much conscious and voluntary decisions on the part of each policy actor as 
decisions that are supplied to him, in the form of unquestioned and self-evident 
assumptions, by the institutions in which he happens to be embedded.... Cultural 
theory, in effect, deconstructs these largely unconscious and involuntary decision 
biases. (141) 
Instead of the interest dope explanation, criticized in Chapter 4, we 
now appear to have the cultural-bias dope explanation! The differ- 
ence, according to the authors, is that cultural theory has good 
reasons to posit its fourfold typology, while the interest explanation is 
always ad hoc. These good reasons, however, turn out, in the end, to 
be derived from a Platonist claim:'. .. the four myths of nature [one 
of the recurring examples of the nature and strength of the cultural 
biases] . . . continually resurface through the turbulent contingencies 
of history to reassert their essential timelessness' (85). And, more 
explicitly going 'from phenomena to the possibility of phenomena' 
(34): 
these myths are eternal objects [,] not directly accessible.... Eternal objects (like 
ways of worldmaking) have to do not with phenomena but with the possibility of 
phenomena, and these two levels are brought into relationship with one another by 
a third factor: the eternal object's mode of ingression into the actuality. This mode 
of ingression is accessible. It reveals itself to us in the form of recurrent identifiable 
elements (commitments, justifications, triumphs, tragedies, strategies, surprises, 
and so on) in our interactions with everything that is not us: our fellow humans and 
our circumambient cosmos. The deep reality that cultural theory enables us to get 
to grips with is our diverse involvements in the one world we all inhabit. (101) 
Even if one doesn't mind the metaphysics, one should note the deep 
ambivalence in cultural theory that is contained in this position. In 
order to make the normative, and in a sense emancipatory point, 
about the need for the four cultures, the 'deconstruction with the help 
of cultural theory' must have effects; but at the same time, in the 
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descriptive-analytical part of the argument, the bounds set by the 
four positions are emphasized. In other words, while we are all bound 
up in one or another of the four cultural biases, cultural theory, 
somehow, allows us to transcend them: 'we should begin, coolly and 
dispassionately, by discovering what these different risk handling 
styles are' (120). The anthropologist can establish the legitimacy of 
the various rationalities, while actors are only concerned to impose 
their own rationality on others (paraphrased from 1 19; the sequel to 
this point will be taken up below). 
In other places, the authors insist that one cannot get out of Plato's 
cave: there is no cosmic exile, no way of standing outside (110), or: 
since we are an essential part of the interactions, we can never stand 
right outside them (148). How can one ever escape? Michael 
Thompson has proposed, in earlier publications, that there is a fifth 
position in the grid-group scheme, that of the hermit, right in the 
middle, and unattached to grid or group.3 In the present book, it is the 
self-reliant mountaineer which is his ideal (and not unrelated to his 
personal experience). In places, the tacit wisdom of the engineer is 
also seen (as I noted already) as being able to handle the three active 
styles, without succumbing to any of them. Creating an additional, 
less dope-like position in the typology is one way to solve the 
ambivalence (provided one allows the hermit to come out of the 
mountains and preach). The other way is the Platonic route: being 
able to recognize ternal objects, seeing through the roman ca clef (89), 
and thus transcending the bounds (the authors refer to A.N. 
Whitehead rather than Plato). 
A third route should be considered, I think. In the same way that 
the reflexivity conundrums (not dissimilar from the present problem- 
atic) can be transcended by action, provided one remains account- 
able, we can say here that the cultural theorist, by becoming 
participant, can have effects, even though he will be forced to take up 
a position against, say, hierarchism, and thus play the role of the 
entrepreneurial individualist or the collectivist. Instead of dis- 
passionateness, we would have constructive switching of positions. In 
fact, when one tries to reconstruct the authors' position on the basis 
of what they say in the book, one finds them switching positions. 
Although their own cognitive style, that of typology, appears to 
belong to the hierarchist position, the authors distantiate themselves 
from 'monster adjusting' (63), and from the pathology of the 
anticipatory mode, which implies, in E.M. Forster's words, 'staggering 
through life fully armed' (105), and go for some hierarchist bashing 
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(105, 115-17 when arguing about irreducible uncertainty in the open 
systems we live in); in other places, they distantiate themselves from 
the individualist and especially the egalitarian viewpoints. 
This third route is important for the argument of the book. The 
authors do discuss what they call 'stolen rhetoric' (73): actors taking 
up positions belonging to another bias, and doing so for strategic 
reasons (although the rhetoric may stick!). What they do not consider 
systematically is the constructive role of actors, or of participant 
analysts, in switching positions (provided they can be asked for their 
reasons, I would add). There are some intriguing excursions into 
dynamics already, for example on p. 100, where individualists are 
sketched as climbing on to the orthodox bandwagon (say, of the 
hierarchists in the 1 950s and 1960s, or of the collectivists in the 1970s) 
as it gathers momentum, because they see a rich source of oppor- 
tunities, and jumping off again as it begins to falter (for example, 
starting to exploit alternative nergy and anti-pollution technology in 
the 1970s and 1980s). Thus, they impart a cyclical pattern to the 
totality - and, hopefully, an element of progress. 
The thrust of the book, the authors insist, is that one should shift 
from the adversary to the exploratory mode. Not whose future will 
win, but how a better future can be reached. And all four cultural 
biases or rationalities have something to contribute. 'While the 
anarchic way that the rationalities have hitherto interacted can no 
doubt be improved upon, one thing is clear: diversity of conviction 
can produce major social benefits' (99, emphasis added). The 
continuing worry of the reader, of course, is whether the production 
of such benefits is historically contingent, or directly related to the 
existence and recognition of a diversity of conviction, and the 
particular diversity of the typology of cultural theory at that. 
The exploratory mode is in order 'when we hear the ominous clash 
of contradictory certainties' (145), and we must then call for cultural 
analysis. But what should the cultural analyst (or the actor recog- 
nizing its insights) then do? 'Intervene constructively', is the general 
idea (108). By being cool and dispassionate, and thus ineffectual? The 
authors are too brief on this point, as they are silent about the how 
and why of outcomes in general. Except, I should add, for some 
intriguing and memorable anecdotes, including the one about the 
senstive economist confronting the Great Energy Chief (of IIASA) 
with a plural rationality argument, and turning out to have been right 
(in a way), even if only after a lot of deconstructive work (including 
work by Michael Thompson). 
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The general reader may well be interested and intrigued, and enjoy 
the parts of the book s/he can relate to. I am not a good judge here, 
being too much involved with these kinds of questions myself, as well 
as having had all sorts of discussions with the authors.4 The issues 
treated are certainly important. Instead of a juggernaut of tech- 
nology, subjecting man and environment to its inexorable 'progress', 
we can now see that '[a]lmost all the technologies we now live with 
( .. . ) went through their crucial early stages in a cloud of contra- 
dictory certainties (. . .)' (25). The authors continue and say that 
'[t]he challenge, therefore, isnot to deny this cloud but to understand 
it'. Their positions are challenging, though not as challenging as the 
authors, complaining about the lack of acceptance of their theory 
(72), seem to think. While most of the examples are striking the real 
issue is to understand how and why we have got our present 
technology and how we can do better in the future. Here, the 
programmatic statements are in place, but I find the guidelines 
unconvincing, when they do no more than refer to the eternal 
interplay of cultural biases. We see the style of writing alternate 
between the felicitous phrase and plodding and somewhat repetitive 
argument. In general, the book attempts to combine Michiel 
Schwarz's ideas and earlier work about controversies and political 
cultures (as related to cultural theory), and technology assessment, 
with Michael Thompson's long- standing involvement with cultural 
theory, and his experiences in living among the energy tribes (and 
elsewhere). United, they fall short of being convincing. They need a 
better meta-cultural theory to make a stand. 
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Peter Galison's book contains an impressively detailed analysis of 
three episodes in the history of modern science. The first deals with a 
sequence of experiments on gyromagnetic effects - for example will 
the rotation of an iron bar cause it to become magnetized, and 
conversely will magnetization cause rotation? These experiments 
stem from Ampere's idea that magnetism is caused by tiny circulating 
electric currents, later identified with orbiting electrons. In 1915, 
Einstein worked on this subject. Galison's critical commentary on the 
design and conduct of these experiments hows the truly enviable 
level at which he is able to engage with the technical content of the 
work. He also brings out some interesting analogies between Ein- 
stein's experimental concerns and his earlier work in the Swiss federal 
patent office, when he was called upon to evaluate competing claims 
about magnetic ompasses. The second case deals with the cosmic ray 
experiments leading to the discovery of an elementary particle, the 
mu-meson, in the 1930s. The third case concerns the discovery (in the 
early 1970s) again in elementary particle physics, of a decay process 
called 'weak neutral currents'. These studies sit between chapters of a 
more general character which are designed to set the work in the 
context of recent discussions in the philosophy and sociology of 
science. 
Throughout the book a number of different aims are pursued in 
parallel. Partly the intention is to draw attention to the sheer 
importance of experiment itself. Along with a number of other 
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